

WOMEN LAWYERS OF UTAH

ANNUAL RETREAT

Saturday, November 7, 2009

Session III: 10:30am to 11:45

“Civility, Professionalism, & Advocacy”

The Honorable Carolyn B. McHugh, Utah Court of Appeals

The Honorable Kate A. Toomey, Third District Court, State of Utah

Ellen Maycock, Kruse Landa Maycock & Rocks, LLC

Moderator: Margaret D. Plane, Senior City Attorney for Salt Lake City

(1.0 hours of professionalism and civility CLE credit approved)

Article 3. Standards of Professionalism and Civility

Rule 14-301. Standards of Professionalism and Civility.

Preamble

A lawyer's conduct should be characterized at all times by personal courtesy and professional integrity in the fullest sense of those terms. In fulfilling a duty to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we must be mindful of our obligations to the administration of justice, which is a truth-seeking process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a rational, peaceful, and efficient manner. We must remain committed to the rule of law as the foundation for a just and peaceful society.

Conduct that may be characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or obstructive impedes the fundamental goal of resolving disputes rationally, peacefully, and efficiently. Such conduct tends to delay and often to deny justice.

Lawyers should exhibit courtesy, candor and cooperation in dealing with the public and participating in the legal system. The following standards are designed to encourage lawyers to meet their obligations to each other, to litigants and to the system of justice, and thereby achieve the twin goals of civility and professionalism, both of which are hallmarks of a learned profession dedicated to public service.

We expect judges and lawyers will make mutual and firm commitments to these standards. Adherence is expected as part of a commitment by all participants to improve the administration of justice throughout Utah. We further expect lawyers to educate their clients regarding these standards and judges to reinforce this whenever clients are present in the courtroom by making it clear that such tactics may hurt the client's case.

Although for ease of usage the term "court" is used throughout, these standards should be followed by all judges and lawyers in all interactions with each other and in any proceedings in Utah. Copies may be made available to clients to reinforce our obligation to maintain and foster these standards. Nothing in these standards supersedes or detracts from existing disciplinary codes or standards of conduct.

1. Lawyers shall advance the legitimate interests of their clients, without reflecting any ill-will that clients may have for their adversaries, even if called upon to do so by another. Instead, lawyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner.
2. Lawyers shall advise their clients that civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are expected. They are tools for effective advocacy and not signs of weakness. Clients have no right to demand that lawyers abuse anyone or engage in any offensive or improper conduct.
3. Lawyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with adversaries. Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law.
4. Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an unjustified inference or otherwise seek to create a "record" that has not occurred.
5. Lawyers shall not lightly seek sanctions and will never seek sanctions against or disqualification of another lawyer for any improper purpose.
6. Lawyers shall adhere to their express promises and agreements, oral or written, and to all commitments reasonably implied by the circumstances or by local custom.
7. When committing oral understandings to writing, lawyers shall do so accurately and completely. They shall provide other counsel a copy for review, and never include substantive matters upon which there has been no agreement, without explicitly advising other counsel. As drafts are exchanged, lawyers shall bring to the attention of other counsel changes from prior drafts.
8. When permitted or required by court rule or otherwise, lawyers shall draft orders that accurately and completely reflect the court's ruling. Lawyers shall promptly prepare and submit proposed orders to other counsel and attempt to reconcile any differences before the proposed orders and any objections are presented to the court.
9. Lawyers shall not hold out the potential of settlement for the purpose of foreclosing discovery, delaying trial, or obtaining other unfair advantage, and lawyers shall timely respond to any offer of settlement or inform opposing counsel that a response has not been authorized by the client.
10. Lawyers shall make good faith efforts to resolve by stipulation undisputed relevant matters, particularly when it is obvious such matters can be proven, unless there is a sound advocacy basis for not doing so.
11. Lawyers shall avoid impermissible ex parte communications.
12. Lawyers shall not send the court or its staff correspondence between counsel, unless such correspondence is relevant to an issue currently pending before the court and the proper evidentiary foundations are met or as such correspondence is specifically invited by the court.
13. Lawyers shall not knowingly file or serve motions, pleadings or other papers at a time calculated to unfairly limit other

counsel's opportunity to respond or to take other unfair advantage of an opponent, or in a manner intended to take advantage of another lawyer's unavailability.

14. Lawyers shall advise their clients that they reserve the right to determine whether to grant accommodations to other counsel in all matters not directly affecting the merits of the cause or prejudicing the client's rights, such as extensions of time, continuances, adjournments, and admissions of facts. Lawyers shall agree to reasonable requests for extension of time and waiver of procedural formalities when doing so will not adversely affect their clients' legitimate rights. Lawyers shall never request an extension of time solely for the purpose of delay or to obtain a tactical advantage.

15. Lawyers shall endeavor to consult with other counsel so that depositions, hearings, and conferences are scheduled at mutually convenient times. Lawyers shall never request a scheduling change for tactical or unfair purpose. If a scheduling change becomes necessary, lawyers shall notify other counsel and the court immediately. If other counsel requires a scheduling change, lawyers shall cooperate in making any reasonable adjustments.

16. Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected.

17. Lawyers shall not use or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment or to burden an opponent with increased litigation expense. Lawyers shall not object to discovery or inappropriately assert a privilege for the purpose of withholding or delaying the disclosure of relevant and non-protected information.

18. During depositions lawyers shall not attempt to obstruct the interrogator or object to questions unless reasonably intended to preserve an objection or protect a privilege for resolution by the court. "Speaking objections" designed to coach a witness are impermissible. During depositions or conferences, lawyers shall engage only in conduct that would be appropriate in the presence of a judge.

19. In responding to document requests and interrogatories, lawyers shall not interpret them in an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant and non-protected documents or information, nor shall they produce documents in a manner designed to obscure their source, create confusion, or hide the existence of particular documents.

20. Lawyers shall not authorize or encourage their clients or anyone under their direction or supervision to engage in conduct proscribed by these Standards.

**Utah Appellate Decisions Regarding
The Standards of Professionalism and Civility**

- 1) *Peters v. Pine Meadows Ranch Home Ass'n*, 2007 UT 2, 151 P.3d 962.

The Utah Supreme Court refused to consider the appeal on the merits due to unprofessional and scandalous material in appellant's briefs. Although the Utah Supreme Court discussed the Standards of Professionalism and Civility (SPC) at length, it actually struck the briefs pursuant to Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. With respect to the SPC, the *Peters* Court stated:

We have sought to encourage the bar to aspire to professionalism and civility in the practice of law through our adoption of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. While these standards are not binding, we encourage members of the bar to study and follow them. Had counsel in the cases at bar observed these standards, he and his clients would not have incurred the severe sanctions we impose today.

Peters, 2007 UT 2, ¶ 22.

- 2) *Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C.*, 2008 UT App 277, 191 P.3d 39.

Appellant argued that the SPC were in direct conflict with Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the issue of when notice of default is required. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Rule 5 relates to notice at the time of filing while Paragraph 16 of the SPC requires notice before filing. The court of appeals explained:

During oral arguments on appeal, counsel for Arbogast stated he believed his June 29, 2006 letter constituted sufficient notice under the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. We have no reason to question the sincerity of that belief. We think, however, the applicable standard requires more than a prospective notice that a complaint will be due in twenty days. Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), would also be sufficient notice, and the applicable standard would have added little. We therefore interpret this particular standard as requiring notice *after* the allotted passage of time for filing an answer but *before* a party actually seeks to obtain the entry of default.

2008 UT App. 277, ¶ 21 n.10.

- 3) *Superior Receivable Servs. v. Pett*, 2008 UT App 225, 191 P.3d 31.

The court of appeals admonished counsel for the language and tenor of the briefs, stating:

On a separate note, we caution Pett's counsel regarding the language used in his brief to this court. Our Standards of Professionalism and Civility provide that "lawyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner." Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility 1. Pett's appellate brief's description of the district court's ruling as "inane" and "a most incredible leap of illogical, irrational, unreasonable, fallacious, and specious lack of reasoning" fails to grant the district court the dignity and respect it deserves. We also caution that "[e]ven where a lawyer's unprofessionalism or incivility does not warrant sanctions, it often will nevertheless diminish his or her effectiveness," Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, ¶ 20, 151 P.3d 962, and in extreme cases can result in the assessment of fees against the offending lawyer or even the striking of substantive arguments to the client's detriment, see id. ¶ 9.

Pett, 2008 UT App. 225, ¶ 12.

- 4) *Bryner v. Lindberg*, 2008 UT App 53U.

The pro se petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that an order requiring him to comply with the SPC constituted "unconstitutional punishment for life" and that he was therefore entitled to release from his captivity. Bryner, 2008 UT App 53U, Para. 1. Although the writ was denied on the basis that petitioner had an alternative, adequate remedy to affect an appeal, see id. Para. 3, the case raises issues likely to recur concerning the application of the SPC to non lawyers.

- 5) *Advanced Restoration, L.L.C. v. Priskos*, 2005 UT App 505, 126 P.3d 786.

The court of appeals strongly cautioned against the use of inflammatory language in briefs:

Although we rule in favor of Advanced in this appeal, we are dismayed by the unprofessional and inappropriate language used by Advanced in its brief, where it states that both

Landlord and Tenant "ought to be ashamed of themselves," and repeatedly refers to opposing counsel's arguments as "revolting," "disingenuous," "nonsensical," "insulting to the intelligence of the Court," "ridiculous," and "reprehensible."

"Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place in an appellate brief and is of no assistance to this court in attempting to resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal." *State v. Cook*, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). We also remind counsel that, as lawyers, they are bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which require lawyers to maintain the decorum of the tribunal, and that "refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants." Utah R. Professional Conduct 3.5 cmt. Additionally, the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court, urge lawyers to "avoid hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with adversaries." Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility 3. Finally, we advise counsel that appellate briefs must be free from "burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer." Utah R. App. P. 24(j).

Priskos, 2005 UT App. 505, ¶ 37 n.13.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

STANDING ORDER NO. 7

(As to establishment of a program of professionalism counseling for members of the Utah State Bar)

Effective April 1, 2008

The Utah Supreme Court (hereinafter the "Court") hereby establishes a board of five counselors (hereinafter the "Board") to counsel and educate members of the Utah State Bar (hereinafter the "Bar") concerning the Court's Standards of Professionalism and Civility (hereinafter the "Standards"). Specifically, the Board's purposes are: (1) to counsel members of the Bar, in response to complaints by other lawyers or referrals from judges; (2) to provide counseling to members of the Bar who request advice on their own obligations under the Standards; (3) to provide CLE on the Standards; (4) to publish advice and information relating to the work of the Board.

Board Composition

Appointees shall serve on a volunteer basis and will be appointed based upon stature in the legal community and experience in legal professionalism matters. A minimum of one of the five appointees shall have transactional experience, and at least one attorney shall have a small firm or sole practitioner experience. Board members shall serve for staggered terms of no fewer than three years for continuity and so that each Board member has the opportunity to develop expertise on the Standards. The Court will appoint one of the Board members as chair. The Board shall generally sit in panels of three to deal with issues presented to the Board.

Submission of Complaints and Questions to the Board

The Board is authorized to consider complaints by lawyers concerning the professionalism of other lawyers, referrals from judges, and questions about professionalism from practicing lawyers. The Board shall not consider questions or complaints from clients or members of the public.

If a lawyer wishes to lodge a complaint with the Board concerning the conduct of another member of the Bar, the complaint must be in writing (i.e., by letter or email) and signed by the complainant. The Board shall not consider anonymous complaints about lawyers. Questions or requests for counseling from a lawyer concerning his or her own conduct need not be in writing but may be made by telephone or a personal visit with members of the Board. Referrals from judges may be directed by telephone.

Procedure

The Board is authorized to develop its own procedures based upon this Standing Order, the purposes for which the program is established, and upon the Board's experience. Adherence to formal rules of procedure or evidence is not required.

Panels should generally resolve complaints about the conduct of an attorney within thirty days of the complaint. Resolution may be by written advisory to the lawyers involved or by a face-to-face meeting with the lawyers. Written advisories should reference te relevant individual Standards.

Confidentiality

The contents of any statement, communication or opinion made by any participant in the program shall be kept confidential except that members of the panel are permitted to communicate directly with lawyers or clients involved in the dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the Standards. Also, the panel is permitted to disclose the general nature of the situation (without identifying names or facts) and its advice to the members of the Bar and the public in reports and Bar Journal articles. Additionally, the members of the panel may communicate with supervisors in firms and agencies whose lawyers have been the subject of a complaint.

The Duty of Good Faith

Attorneys seeking the assistance of the Board shall do so only in good faith and not for purposes of harassment or to attain a strategic advantage. The Board is authorized to terminate any proceeding or referral that it believes has been initiated or utilized in bad faith or for an improper purpose.

Publication

The Board shall report annually to the Court concerning its operation, the Standards it has interpreted, the advice it has given, and any trends it believes important for the Court to know about. It should also make suggestions to the Court as to needed changes to the Standards.

The Board shall periodically publish selected portions of its advisories in the Utah Bar Journal for the benefit of practicing lawyers. Published advisories shall be redacted to eliminate the names and identifying factual details of the cases considered by the panels. Also, the Board shall maintain a web page under the auspices of the Court or the Bar that provides a database of its advisories.

« Outsourcing - for Easy, Effective Data Protection | Main | Why Don't They Like Us? »

Standards for Standards' Sake

Standards for Standards' Sake:

by Eric K. Johnson

On October 16, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court approved Rule 23 of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Administration (itself comprised of twenty new rules), entitled "Standards of Professionalism and Civility" "[t]o enhance the daily experience of lawyers and the reputation of the Bar as a whole." I am all for satisfying daily experiences and for burnishing the Bar's reputation, but I submit that the passage of twenty new rules over and above those that already apply to the profession do little to achieve either goal. This is not to state that the motives for Standards are somehow wrongheaded. The Preamble to the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, which has no normative force, is, for the most part, as sensible as it is aspirational. It reads, in part:

In fulfilling a duty to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we must be mindful of our obligations to the administration of justice, which is a truth-seeking process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a rational, peaceful, and efficient manner. We must remain committed to the rule of law as the foundation for a just and peaceful society.

* * * * *

The following standards are designed to encourage lawyers to meet their obligations to each other, to litigants and to the system of justice, and thereby achieve the twin goals of civility and professionalism.

No one can seriously argue with promoting courtesy, integrity, reason, peace, and efficiency; but in its aspirations lie the flaws in the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. First, the Standards are well meaning, but idealistic in the negative sense of the word (i.e., inherently unattainable in the real world). Second, the Standards are undefined, ambiguous and duplicative of pre-existing rules. Third, while the Standards are intended as a shield, they can be just as much a sword for hacks to use offensively against the virtuous attorneys.

For example, Standard 1 provides in pertinent part that "lawyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner." Is it discourteous or undignified to opposing counsel your honest belief that his case is frivolous? Is it discourteous or undignified to tell opposing counsel that if he does not withdraw the false representations in his pleadings you will seek Rule 11 sanctions? Arguably, it is. If so, when did litigators, who chose a profession based on an adversarial system of conflict resolution, become so thin-skinned that arguing - even heated arguing - between them became unprofessional? Litigators are, after all, professional arguers (in a venerable tradition at that). How does one address the misconduct of the opposing side without either risking running afoul of Standard 1 or being a wimp? As experience quickly teaches lawyers (persons not generally known for humility or small egos), one man's honesty and candor is the other man's incivility and offensiveness, especially if the ostensibly "offended" party can make hay out of it. Standard 1 provides a fertile field ripe for harvest.

Along the same lines Standard 2 provides "civility, courtesy, and fair dealing . . . are tools for effective advocacy and not signs of weakness."

Sure, tell that to the attorney on the opposing side who delights in grandstanding for his client in front of civil, courteous, and fair doormats. I'm not advocating fighting fire with fire or the law of the jungle as a guiding principle, but come on; sometimes the only way to stop bad behavior is by giving the other guy a taste of his own medicine. Take that away (as Standard 2 appears to do) and it's open season on nice guys, period.

Search
Search Bar Journal:

About
This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on **June 11, 2005 10:31 PM**.
The previous post in this blog was Outsourcing - for Easy, Effective Data Protection.
The next post in this blog is Why Don't They Like Us?.
Many more can be found on the main index page or by looking through the archives.

[Subscribe to this feed](#)

Standard 3 provides: Lawyers should avoid hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with adversaries. Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law.

So, if opposing counsel is, in your honest, (but merely) professional opinion, filing improper motions, delaying his responses in discovery, writing you unsolicited nastygrams, and generally misbehaving, what are you to do? If he accuses you of being unethical or unprofessional, can you no longer label him "the pot calling the kettle black" for fear of being labeled a Standard 3 violator? Can't you even blow off steam with a terse response for fear that you have "demeaned, humiliated, or disparaged" the guy who has demeaned, humiliated, and disparaged you? Now, where do you turn for relief? The judge? Please (see *Infra*). Why can't we just do as we've done in the past and call or write to the opposing attorney and express yourself? An exchange of words does no real or lasting harm. If a lawyer goes too far in exercising his or her free speech rights, there are laws against harassment and defamation already on the books to provide protection.

There are effectively no rules if only one side to the dispute follows and/or is held to them. Why set standards that cannot be objectively met and that cannot be objectively enforced? Standards 1 through 3 neither raise the bar nor level the playing field and are neither a means nor an end. Sadly (though not unexpectedly), this is why the Standards generally are less an effective prescription for improved lawyer behavior than they are an inarticulate acknowledgment of the chronic bad behaviors of some lawyers. Surely I am not the only lawyer who sees that these twenty (20) new rules serve as much (if not more) to fetter the good guys and give the scalawags a new source of nuisance and guilt-mongering than to usher in a new era of good behavior.

Standard 4 provides: Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an unjustified inference or otherwise seek to create a "record" that has not occurred.

How can one ever effectively prove that opposing counsel "knowingly" attributed to other counsel a position or claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an unjustified inference? For you very young lawyers, just try to call opposing counsel on this during a hearing or in a memorandum and see how the judge reacts, you arrogant, whiney, upstart. And even if you were to prove such misconduct, what are the odds of that attorney being effectively sanctioned for it? After all, you now have Standards 3 and 5 to contend with yourself.

Standard 5 provides: Lawyers shall not lightly seek sanctions and will never seek sanctions against or disqualification of another lawyer for any improper purpose.

It's hard enough to earnestly seek and obtain sanctions for any proper purpose without Standard 5 throwing up additional barriers. Now add to the sorry state of doormat attorneys the new rule of Standard 5 and you provide but more defenses for the hacks: "Your Honor, opposing counsel's request for sanctions on the ground that I counseled my client to lie under oath are lightly sought and for an improper purpose, in violation of Standard 5. Unless he can prove otherwise, I ask that the request for sanctions be dismissed and opposing counsel admonished for disparaging and humiliating me in violation of Standard 3." Heaven help us.

Standard 9 provides: Lawyers shall not hold out the potential of settlement for the purpose of foreclosing discovery, delaying trial, or obtaining other unfair advantage, and lawyers shall timely respond to any offer of settlement or inform opposing counsel that a response has not been authorized by the client.

No new rule or combination of rules will ever do away with this time-tested trick. No savvy attorney would suggest that an offer of settlement was used against him to hold up discovery or delay trial. If you did, can't you just hear that weasel on the other end of the phone now?:

WEASEL: I am shocked that you'd see my making repeated settlement inquiries (every time you ask for the production of discovery responses or seek to certify the case for trial) as a delay tactic; after all, if we settle, we spare our client's time, money [voice cracks] and trauma. Why would I seek a settlement, of all things, to cause delays? It's ludicrous; and I've never been so offended in my 20 months of practice. I'd seek sanctions against you under the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, if I thought it would do any good.

The potential for a legitimate settlement - no matter how remote it may be - always exists. Thus, even in the most hotly contested matters it is virtually impossible to show whether a lawyer held out the potential of settlement for legitimate purposes or not. Standard 9, like the other Standards,

is on a practical basis impossible to enforce.

Standard 10 provides: Lawyers shall make good faith efforts to resolve by stipulation undisputed relevant matters, particularly when it is obvious such matters can be proven, unless there is a sound advocacy basis for not doing so.

Can you find the "obvious" flaw in this rule that renders it all but completely impotent? Moreover, if you ever find yourself confronted with what you believe is an undisputed and indisputable fact, you've likely been in practice two years or less (and if you've been practicing longer, but still think there's such a thing as an indisputable fact, your practice must be limited to administrative law, representing the government).

Standard 11 provides: Lawyers shall avoid impermissible ex parte communications.

As if having more rules about ex parte communications makes any difference in curtailing the problem. Did we need a new rule to inform us that impermissible ex parte communications aren't permitted? Aside from Standard 11's utter lack of guidance as to what constitutes "impermissible ex parte communications," we already have a rule against impermissible ex parte communications, a definition of the term, and a means for sanctioning it (See Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.5).

Standard 12 provides: Lawyers shall not send the court or its staff correspondence between counsel, unless such correspondence is relevant to an issue currently pending before the court and the proper evidentiary foundations are met or as such correspondence is specifically invited by the court.

Isn't this a problem whose most elegant solution is already in practice and is adequately functioning? If the judge wants to read such correspondence, she will. If she deems it inappropriate or potentially prejudicial, she will throw it out and may or may not admonish the offending lawyer. Some courts go so far as to tell counsel that they will not forward any correspondence between counsel to the court if it is not captioned or otherwise part of a pleading. Why did we need a rule for a problem that's not all that pervasive to codify what is already being adequately enforced at the receiving end?

Standard 13 provides: Lawyers shall not knowingly file or serve motions, pleadings or other papers at a time calculated to unfairly limit other counsel's opportunity to respond or to take other unfair advantage of an opponent, or in a manner intended to take advantage of another lawyer's unavailability.

Attorneys should eschew sharp practices, but no one should be formally sanctioned for following the letter of the law. Even Thomas More, I submit, would agree with that. More importantly, how can one fairly be punished for following the letter of the law? Furthermore, if compliance with rules constitutes "incivility" there goes the rule of law. If you struggle with whether "maliciously" obeying the rules of court is worse than otherwise being uncivil in relationships with opposing counsel, become a mediator. Besides, it's not as though attorneys victimized by punctilious rule followers have no recourse. The odds are better than even that if you complain to the judge about being served with a proposed order that was hand-delivered to your office after 5:00 p.m. on the Wednesday prior to Thanksgiving, you'll get your extension. The system does generally work.

Standards 14 and 15 provide: Lawyers shall never request an extension of time solely for the purpose of delay or to obtain a tactical advantage.

Lawyers shall never request a scheduling change for tactical or unfair purpose. If a scheduling change becomes necessary, lawyers shall notify other counsel and the court immediately.

And throwing cigarette butts on the ground is littering. Which of these offenses is likely to be prosecuted and/or punished first? Don't starve making this Hobson's choice. People who don't know me may not believe this, but when an ethically-challenged attorney asked me for a continuance by claiming he had a conflicting engagement, I asked that attorney for the court and the case number so that I could confirm his story. He harrumphed and refused to disclose what the supposed "conflict" was, but he didn't get his continuance. I manage to handle such situations to my satisfaction without the assistance of Standard 14 or 15. Besides, unless a lawyer is willing to ferret out false claims of need for extensions or schedule changes, Standards 14 and 15 are of no practical benefit anyway.

Standard 16 provides: Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected.

Standards for Standards' Sake (Utah Bar Journal)

To its credit, here's a rule that if violated has at least a better than even chance of being proven it was violated. Even so, what's so terribly wrong about defaulting a party worthy of default, and doing so without flagging the inattentive opposing attorney? Besides, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Procedure already provides, in Subparagraph (c)(1):

The summons . . . shall state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant.
(emphasis added).

Why, when Rule 4 already mandates notice to the defendant of the possibility of default, was it necessary to create essentially another notice requirement with Standard 16? We all know or should know that defaulting a fellow attorney without warning causes more trouble for the attorney seeking default than it's worth to him. Additionally, does Standard 16 create a possible conflict between it and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55, which contains no requirement that notice be given to opposing counsel in advance of seeking default? If so, why not repeal Standard 16 and amend Rule 55 to include a notice provision? Moreover, wouldn't obeying Standard 16 basically allow the opposing side to delay proceedings by failing to participate in the case and relying on the opposing attorney's Rule 16 obligation of "notifying other counsel," in advance, at which point the scheming "lazy" attorney finally files his responsive pleading so that the case is decided on the precious merits? Rule 55 is already honored in the breach. Did we really need to eviscerate it even more with Standard 16?

Standard 17 provides: Lawyers shall not use or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment or to burden an opponent with increased litigation expense. Lawyers shall not object to discovery or inappropriately assert a privilege for the purpose of withholding or delaying the disclosure of relevant and non-protected information.

Standard 18 provides: During depositions lawyers shall not attempt to obstruct the interrogator or object to questions unless reasonably intended to preserve an objection or protect a privilege for resolution by the court. "Speaking objections" designed to coach a witness are impermissible. During depositions or conferences, lawyers shall engage only in conduct that would be appropriate in the presence of a judge.

Standard 19 provides: In responding to document requests and interrogatories, lawyers shall not interpret them in an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant and non-protected documents or information, nor shall they produce documents in a manner designed to obscure their source, create confusion, or hide the existence of particular documents.

With respect to Standards 17 through 19, lawyers are already subject to provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence when engaging in the discovery process, and they already arguably prescribe the same conduct sought by Standards 17 through 19. Moreover, Standards 17 through 19, like the rules of civil procedure and evidence, are so vulnerable to self-serving interpretation and construction that promulgating even more subjective rules will do nothing more to curtail discovery abuses than the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence already do (or don't, as the case may be).

Victor Cousin, the 19th century philosopher stated, "We need . . . art for art's sake."¹ W. Somerset Maugham who wrote, "Art for art's sake makes no more sense than gin for gin's sake." Standards for standards' sake are no more sensible. In reviewing the Standards of Professionalism and Civility, I see no pre-existing need that is filled by their passage, no flaw in the existing rules of professional conduct that the Standards remedy. The Standards are prone to subjective interpretation and construction to the point of being meaningless, thus, unenforceable, and thus irrelevant to a lawyer's daily practice. Most, if not all, of the Standards as currently constituted, do little to lead good lawyers or bad lawyers to be any better than they would have been in their absence. In this regard the Standards of Professionalism and Civility do little to address or cure any lack of professionalism and civility in the profession.

1. The full quotation is, "We need religion for religion's sake, morality for morality's sake, and art for art's sake." Surprisingly, the work of Cousin fell into obscurity.

Posted on June 11, 2005 10:31 PM | Permalink

The Utah State Bar presents this web site as a service to our members and to the public. Information presented in this site is NOT legal